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I. INTRODUCTION
A UCTIONS are effective for allocating resources among participants. In this setup, a set of participants first submit their evaluations (bids) of the resources, then a central operator determines the allocation for each participant, through the auction mechanism. Recently, there has been a surge of interest from the control community to explore such mechanisms because of their applications in several problems, such as coordinating electric vehicle charging [1] , double-sided auctions in telecommunication and power networks [2] , demand response management [3] , and provisioning of public goods [4] , [5] . The central element in any auction mechanism is the design of the payment rule, since the participants have incentives to strategize around these rules. In particular, the central operator designs these payments to ensure efficient outcome, that is, the outcome maximizing the social welfare. This goal can only be achieved by solving for the optimal allocation under the condition that the participants submitted their true evaluations.
In this paper, we consider mechanism design for reverse auctions that may involve continuum values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. This is motivated by the fact that several current energy market problems can be cast within this general class of auctions [6] - [8] . Previous work on these markets consider the pay-as-bid mechanism [9] and the locational marginal pricing mechanism [10] . In both mechanisms, participants can bid strategically to influence their utilities since these mechanisms do not incentivize truthful bidding. As an alternative, we analyze the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which has several impressive theoretical virtues [11] - [13] . Unlike the other mechanisms, under the VCG mechanism, every participant finds it more profitable to bid truthfully regardless of the bids of the others. Hence, truthful bidding is the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium, and we refer to this property as incentive-compatibility. Due to this property, several recent work proposes the use of the VCG mechanism [1] , [2] , [14] , [15] .
Despite the good theoretical properties of the VCG mechanism, in practice, it is often deemed undesirable since coalitions of participants can strategically bid to increase their collective utility. Hence, it is susceptible to different kinds of manipulations, such as collusion and shill bidding [16] . Furthermore, the central operator may distribute very large payments despite the presence of a high competition from the participants. These shortcomings are decisive in questioning the practicality of the VCG mechanism since, in a larger context, the VCG mechanism is not truthful. As a result, practical applications of a VCG mechanism in real commerce are rare at best [16] , [17] .
As is outlined in auction theory literature [16] , the shortcomings we mentioned occur when the VCG outcome is not in the core. The core is a concept from coalitional game theory where the participants have no incentives to leave the grand coalition [18] . From the central operator's perspective, when the VCG outcome is not in the core, the operator would instead want to renegotiate the payments with a subset of participants. Recently, coalitional game theory received great attention, especially for aggregating power generators [19] , and deriving control policies [20] . In this paper, we use coalitional game theory to ensure that the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof, in other words, collusion and shill bidding are not profitable. We prove that the coalition-proof outcomes are achievable if the VCG outcome lies in the core. We derive restrictions on the bids and the constraints to ensure core VCG outcomes. To this end, we utilize some important results from combinatorial optimization. We show that under convex (or marginally increasing) bids and polymatroid type constraints the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof.
Unfortunately, the restricted market setting for coalitionproof VCG outcomes does not capture the complexity of general reverse auctions, for instance, those arising in the electricity markets. Specifically, these markets may involve nonconvex bids (generator startup costs), and complex constraint sets. Hence, it may not be possible to ensure coalitionproof VCG outcomes. To this end, we focus our attention on the payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the bids and the constraints. In particular, we show that selecting the payments from the core yields such desirable property. Naturally, these mechanisms relax the incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanism. In order to alleviate this issue and incentivize truthfulness, we minimize the participants' ability to benefit from strategic manipulation among all other coalition-proof mechanisms [21] - [23] . Furthermore, these mechanisms can avoid very large payments possible in the VCG mechanism since they select core outcomes. Such mechanisms are implemented in high stakes auctions for selling spectrum licenses in the United Kingdom and Switzerland [24] . The United States also planned to use it for auctioning airport takeoff and landing slots. However, studies of these payment rules are limited to the forward auctions of multiple items. We extend it to the reverse auctions with potentially continuum values of goods, second stage costs, and general constraints.
The definition of the core constraints requires solving the reverse auction problem under exponentially many subsets of participants. Hence, the good properties of the bidder optimal core-selecting mechanisms are accompanied by computational difficulties. We first show that the problem size of calculating these payments can be reduced significantly. As suggested in [25] for the auctions of multiple items, the state of the art approach is to generate core constraints on demand via constraint generation algorithms. As an alternative method, we then formulate the constraint generation algorithm for the reverse auctions under consideration.
It is worth contrasting our work with the research from the control community related to the mechanism design. First, the works in [1] , [2] , concentrate on the decentralized iteration procedures for the calculation of the VCG payments under some limits on the allowable set of bids. Second, the work in [14] applies the VCG mechanism to the wholesale electricity markets and shows that it results in larger payments than the ones of the locational marginal pricing mechanism. However, these works do not consider the shortcomings associated with the VCG mechanisms. Third, the works in [26] - [30] study the design of the participants' utilities/objective functions such that the behavior of the participants results in a social welfare maximizing outcome. By contrast, in our case, the true evaluations of the participants are a priori unknown and they are not part of the design. Instead, we are guiding the participants to a social welfare maximizing outcome by distributing meaningful incentives. Finally, a very brief version of this work was presented in our previous work [15] . We provide the missing proofs. We then extend it with a class of reverse auction models where we can ensure core VCG outcomes. Previous work also did not consider the coalitionproof mechanisms.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we show that the efficiency and the truthfulness of the VCG mechanism holds even in the general setting we consider, see Theorem 1.
Second, we prove that the core VCG outcomes are coalitionproof and the VCG outcomes lie in the core if and only if the market objective value is supermodular, see Theorems 2 and 3. Third, we derive conditions on the bids and the constraint sets under which the VCG mechanism is a coalition-proof mechanism, see Theorems 4 and 5. Fourth, in Theorem 6, we show that selecting payments from the core results in a coalition proof mechanism without any restrictions on bids and constraints. Finally, we address the computational difficulties of these mechanisms by providing two efficient methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce a constrained optimization problem that models a general class of reverse auctions. Then, we introduce the VCG mechanism and illustrate that coalitions of participants can influence the outcome. For an analysis of this shortcoming, in Section III, we bring in tools from coalitional game theory, namely the core, in which the participants do not have incentives for leaving the grand coalition. Throughout this Section, we investigate the conditions under which the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof. Since these conditions do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions, alternative payment rules are proposed in Section IV. In Section V, we present several case studies based on electricity market data to illustrate the conditions we derived and the proposed payment rules.
II. MECHANISM FRAMEWORK
We start with a generic reverse auction model. The set of auction participants consists of the central operator l = 0 and the bidders L = {1, . . . , |L|}. Let there be t types of goods in the reverse auction. Each bidder l has a private true cost function c l : R t + → R + that is nondecreasing with c l (0) = 0. Each bidder l submits a bid function to the central operator, denoted by b l : R t + → R + and nondecreasing with b l (0) = 0. Given the bid profile B = {b l } l∈L , a mechanism defines the allocation rule x * l (B) ∈ R t + and the payment rule p l (B) ∈ R for each bidder l. In an auction, a bidder whose bid is not accepted is paid nothing. The utility of bidder l is hence
Here y ∈ R p are additional variables entering the central operator's optimization, in addition to the allocation x ∈ R t|L| . The function d : R t|L| + × R p → R is an additional cost term. For example, in a two-stage auction model, the operator can buy the goods from another market. In this case, y corresponds to the second stage variables and the function d is the second stage cost.
In most auction mechanisms, the allocation is determined by minimizing the central operator's objective function subject to some constraints:
where g : R t|L| + × R p → R q defines the constraints. (If the above optimization problem is infeasible then the objective value is J(B) = ∞.) Let us assume that in case of multiple optima, there is some tie-breaking rule according to a predetermined fixed ordering of the bidders. The solution of the optimization problem (1) is the optimal allocation with respect to the submitted bids: the goods are bought from the bidders with lower bid prices. We consider this to be essential since it promotes fairness. As a result, the total payment made by the central operator is given by
which can be treated as the utility of the central operator.
Note that this payment can be an expected payment when the function d is an expected second stage cost. Constrained optimization problem (1) defines a general class of reverse auction models, where the prices from bids do not enter the constraints. Several current market problems such as the stochastic energy market mechanisms [6] , [7] , [31] - [33] and energy-reserve co-optimized markets [8] , [14] , [34] - [38] can be cast within this model. The constraints may correspond to procurement of the required amounts of power supplies, that is, in the Swiss control reserve markets accepted reserves must have a deficit probability of less than 0.2%. They may also correspond to a transmission network, that is, in the energy markets power injections must satisfy the transmission line limits and the power-flow equations.
Three fundamental properties we desire in the mechanism design are 1) individual rationality, 2) efficiency and 3) dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility. A mechanism is individually rational if the bidders do not face negative utilities, u l (B) ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L. A mechanism is efficient if the sum of all the utilities |L| l=0 u l (B) is maximized. To define the third property, we first bring in tools from game theory. Let B −l be the bid profile of all the bidders, except bidder l. The bid profile B is a Nash equilibrium if for every bidder l,
Let the truthful bid profile be C = {c l } l∈L . Then, a mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (D.S.I.C) if the bid profile C is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. In other words, every bidder finds it more profitable to bid truthfully, regardless of the bids of other bidders.
Next, we are ready to introduce the payment rules for the reverse auction (1).
A. Currently used payment rules
We introduce two prominent payment rules widely used for the reverse auctions under consideration.
In the pay-as-bid mechanism, the payment rule is
It follows that each bidder's utility is
. A rational bidder would overbid to ensure positive utility. Consequently, under the pay-as-bid mechanism, the central operator calculates the optimal allocation for the inflated bids rather than the true costs. Furthermore, the bidders need to spend resources to learn how to bid to maximize their utility. There are many Nash equilibria arising from the payas-bid mechanism, none of which are incentive-compatible. This result was previously shown in our work, see [9] .
The locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism is adopted in the energy markets where transmission networks are present. We refer to [14] for an exposition on the calculation of these payments from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the optimization problem (1) . Under this mechanism, a bidder can manipulate these prices by inflating or deflating their bids. As a strategic manipulation, a bidder may also withhold its maximum supply [39] , [40] . Similar to the payas-bid mechanism, the bidders need to spend resources to learn how to maximize their utilities. Furthermore, under this mechanism, there may not exist an equilibrium [41] , [42] .
We see that these payment rules do not satisfy the properties of efficiency and incentive-compatibility. Next, we explore the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
B. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
As an alternative to these payment rules, the Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism is characterized with the payment rule:
). The function h(B −l ) ∈ R must be carefully chosen to ensure individual rationality. A particular choice is Clarke pivot rule: h(B −l ) = J(B −l ), where J(B −l ) denotes the minimum total cost without bidder l, that is, the optimal value of the optimization problem in (1) with x l = 0. Note that this mechanism is well-defined under the assumption that there exists a feasible solution when a bidder is removed. However, this is not a restrictive assumption in the presence of many bidders and a second-stage.
For the model introduced in (1), our first result shows that the VCG mechanism first derived in [11] - [13] satisfy all three fundamental properties. We take into account that the market model (1) is a reverse auction with nonstandard constraints. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 1: Given the market model (1). a) The VCG mechanism is Dominant-Strategy IncentiveCompatible (D.S.I.C). b) The VCG mechanism is efficient. c) The VCG mechanism ensures positive transfers and individual rationality when the Clarke pivot rule is utilized, h(B −l ) = J(B −l ). In summary, all bidders have incentives to reveal their true costs in a VCG mechanism, and solving for the optimal allocation with the true costs yields an efficient mechanism. Dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility makes it easier for entities to enter the auction, without spending resources in computing optimal bidding strategies. This can promote participation to the market. Finally, since bidders bid truthfully, each bidder's utility is given by u l (C) = J(C −l ) − J(C).
Despite many advantages of the VCG mechanism for the reverse auction in (1), it suffers from collusion and shill bidding [16] . The bidders l ∈ K are colluders if they obtain higher collective utility by changing their bids from
The bidder l is a shill bidder if it finds participating in the auction with the set of bids B S = {b k } k∈S from multiple identities more profitable than participating with the single bid b l ( k∈S x k ) = k∈S b k (x k ). A shill bidder might then collude the bids from multiple identities in order to make use of both shortcomings of the VCG mechanism.
To illustrate these issues, we study two energy market examples. For these examples, we consider the VCG mechanism with the Clark-pivot rule and with d(x, y) ≡ 0 in the central operator's objective. Later, we come back to these examples in Section III, in order to discuss conditions to eliminate collusion and shill-bidding. First example is a reverse auction of a single type of power supply. In these markets, each bidder make mutually exclusive bids that can equivalently be represented as bid curves, see Section III-A.
Example 1 (Simple Market): Suppose the central operator has to procure 800 MW of power supply from bidders 1, 2 and 3 who have the true costs 100 CHF for 400 MW, 400 CHF for 400 MW and 600 CHF for 800 MW, respectively. Under the VCG mechanism, bidders 1 and 2 win and receive p = 400 + (600 − 500) = 500 CHF. Suppose bidders 1 and 2 collude and change their bids to 0 CHF for 400 MW. Then, bidders 1 and 2 receive a payment of 600 CHF each. In fact, bidders 1 and 2 could represent multiple identities of a single losing bidder (that is, a bidder with the true cost greater than 600 CHF for 800 MW). Entering the market with two shill bids, this bidder receives a payment of 2 × 600 CHF for 800 MW.
Second example is a power market where the operator is procuring a set of different types of power supplies.
Example 2 (Power Market): We consider a reverse auction with three different types of supplies, type A, type B and type C. Here, type A can replace types B and C at the same time. Suppose the central operator has to procure 100 MW of type B and 100 MW of type C (or only 100 MW of type A) from bidders 1 to 5. Truthful bid profiles of 5 bidders are provided in Table I . We have the following constraint set:
Under the VCG mechanism, bidder 1 wins and receives p VCG 1 = 500 + (600 − 500) = 600 CHF. Suppose losing bidders 2 and 4 collude and change their bid prices to 0 CHF. Then, bidders 2 and 4 receive 400 CHF each and they obtain a collective profit of 200 CHF. Total payment of the central operator increases from 600 CHF to 800 CHF.
It is troubling that the VCG mechanism can result in large payments through coalitions even when the objective value in (1) is low. For the central operator, this large total payment is the primary concern. Furthermore, in all these examples, there exists a group of bidders who are willing to offer the same amount of good by receiving less payment.
Next, we define the desirable auction outcomes as the coalition-proof outcomes. By coalition-proof, we mean that a group of bidders, who lose when bidding their true cost, cannot profit by a joint deviation, and a bidder cannot profit from bidding with multiple identities. Consequently, auctions with coalition-proof outcomes are immune to collusion and shill bidding, and they would not result in large payments through coalitions. We remark that it is not possible to expect being fully immune to the collusions from all sets of bidders [43] . For instance, no mechanism can eliminate the case where all bidders are inflating their bid prices at the same time. Hence, we concentrate our efforts on eliminating the collusions from the bidders who lose while bidding truthfully.
Our goal now is to derive conditions that make the auction outcomes coalition-proof, that is, collusion and shill bidding are eliminated.
III. ENSURING COALITION-PROOF VCG OUTCOMES
We first bring in tools from the coalitional game theory for our analysis. In coalitional game theory, the core defines the set of utility allocations that cannot be improved upon by forming coalitions 1 . Later, we show that if the VCG outcome lies in the core, then it eliminates any incentives for collusion and shill bidding. Keeping this in mind, our goal is to derive sufficient conditions to ensure that the VCG outcome lies in the core, and hence the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof.
For every S ⊆ L, let J(B S ) be the objective value under any set of bids B S = {b l } l∈S from the coalition S. It is defined by the following expression:
where the stacked vector x −S ∈ R t(|L|−|S|) + is defined by omitting the vectors from the set S.
Next, we define the core with respect to the truthful bids, C R = {c l } l∈R , and refer to this definition solely as the core.
Definition 1: For every set of bidders R ⊆ L, the core
Note that there are 2 |R| linear constraints that define a utility allocation in the core for the set of bidders R. The core is always nonempty in the auction problems because the utility allocation u 0 = −J(C R ) and u l = 0 for all l ∈ R always lies in the core. This allocation corresponds to the utility allocation of the pay-as-bid mechanism under the truthful bidding strategies.
For the mechanism design, we highlight the implications of the constraints defined by the core. Restricting the utility allocation to the nonnegative orthant yields the property of individual rationality for the bidders. The equality constraint implies that the mechanism is efficient. We say that a utility allocation is unblocked if there is no set of bidders that could make a deal with the operator from which all of them would benefit, including the operator. This condition is satisfied by the inequality constraints.
It is known that the VCG outcome attains the maximal utility in the core for every dimension. To see that, set u [44] . Hence, the VCG outcome may not lie in the core. The following example gives visual insight about the core and illustrates the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the VCG mechanism for Example 1 in which shill bidding and collusion are profitable.
Example 3: We revisit Example 1. Assume that, in case of a tie, the central operator prefers bidder 1 and 2 over bidder 3. Core outcomes and the VCG payments (p Next, we are ready to investigate the conditions under which the VCG outcome lies in the core. To this end, we provide three conditions that ensure core VCG outcomes for the abstraction in (1). First, we need the following equivalent characterization of the core with significantly lower number of constraints. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Lemma 1: Let W ⊆ L be the winners of the reverse auction (1) for the set of bidders L, and u ∈ R × R |L| + be the corresponding utility allocation. Set u 0 = −J(C) − l∈L u l . Then, u ∈ Core(C) if and only if
The following proposition is our first sufficient condition for core VCG outcomes.
Proposition 1: The VCG outcome is in the core for any set of bids, u VCG ∈ Core(C), if the market (1) is infeasible whenever any two winners l 1 , l 2 ∈ W are removed from the set of all bidders L.
Proof: Given this property of the market, core constraints in (4) simplify to constraints on the utilities of single bidders, u
This inequality follows directly from the definition of the VCG utility.
However, this condition can only be present in some specialized instances of reverse auctions. It is not possible, in general, to guarantee that this condition will hold in a market by enforcing restrictions on the bidders and the market model.
We soon see that supermodularity provides a condition for core VCG outcomes.
Indeed supermodularity of the objective value is necessary and sufficient for core VCG outcomes. Note that a similar result was proven in [16] , for a sale auction of a finite number of objects, without any constraints. Our result generalizes this to the reverse auctions with continuous goods and arbitrary central operator objectives and constraints of the form (1). The proof developed also significantly simplifies the arguments in [16] . The proof is relegated to Appendix C.
Theorem 2: For any set of bids C, the outcome of the VCG mechanism is in the core for every subset of auction bidders R ⊆ L, that is, u ∈ Core(C R ), ∀R ⊆ L, if and only if the objective value, J in (3), is supermodular.
As previously anticipated, we can now prove that the core outcomes, hence the supermodularity condition, makes collusion and shill bidding unprofitable in a VCG mechanism. The proof is relegated to Appendix D.
Theorem 3: For the set of bidders L, consider a VCG auction mechanism modeled by (1) . If the VCG outcome lies in the core for any set of bids, then, (i) A group of bidders who lose when bidding their true values cannot profit by a joint deviation. (ii) Bidding with multiple identities is unprofitable for all bidders. We showed that if the central operator has a supermodular objective value, then the VCG outcome lies in the core and the mechanism is coalition-proof. In general, it is hard to characterize what conditions on the market model (1) makes the objective value supermodular. Next, we consider two simplified reverse auctions where it is possible to derive sufficient conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint set in order to ensure supermodularity and, thus, coalitionproof outcomes.
A. Markets for a single type of good
We start by considering simpler reverse auctions where the operator has to procure a fixed amount M of a single type of good. Each bidder l has a private true cost function c l : R + → R + that is nondecreasing with c l (0) = 0. These types of auctions are mainly characterized by single-stage decisions with mutually exclusive bids. This means that a bidder can offer a set of bids, of which only one can be accepted. We first show that such discrete bids fit into our model (1) . Here, bidder l submits truthful bids for n l discrete amounts as {(c l,i , x l,i )} n l i=1 where the amount offered by each bidder x l,i ∈ R + must be equally spaced by some increment m, that is,
Even though the offers are indivisible, amounts up to the size of the winning bid must be available to the operator. Therefore, there is an equivalent representation of the form c l (x) ∈ R + for x > 0 as follows:
where c l (0) = 0. This form equivalently represents that the amounts up to the size of the winning bid are available to the operator. Furthermore, the bid prices of this form are piecewise constant and continuous from the left. We consider auctions modeled by
for S ⊆ L. Note, we can equivalently assume that x l , above, takes values in {x l,i | i ∈ Z + } ⊆ R + (cf. (6) and Figure 2 ) and doing so, we let x * = (x * l : l ∈ S) be the optimal values in these sets.
The model above is within the market model (1). We can now derive conditions on bidders' true costs to ensure supermodularity of J. Thus, we derive conditions under which the VCG outcome from (7) would lie in the core. The proof is relegated to Appendix E.
Theorem 4: If the true costs are marginally increasing, namely, x l,b −x l,a = x l,d −x l,c implies that c l,b −c l,a < c l,d − c l,c for each bidder l ∈ L and for each 0 ≤ x l,a < x l,c < x l,d , then the objective value J is supermodular.
As a corollary of this result, marginally increasing costs imply coalition-proof VCG outcomes for (7) and thus eliminate incentives for collusion and shill bidding. This condition is visualized in Figure 2 . Selecting m → 0 (forcing participants to provide continuous bid curves), the condition in Theorem 4 is equivalent to the strict convexity of the true cost curves, that is, for all x <x, c l (x) <ċ l (x), ∀l. Throughout our proof, we highlight that Theorem 4 also applies to the case of continuous strictly convex costs when m → 0.
We illustrate this result by revisiting Example 1 from Section II.
Example 4 (Simple Market
Unfortunately, these conditions are not enough to conclude supermodularity of the market model described in (1), because this model does not capture the complexity of the constraint set. Next, we consider the reverse auctions with different types of goods where it is still possible to derive conditions to ensure supermodularity and coalition-proof VCG outcomes.
B. Markets for different types of goods
We now consider the reverse auctions where the central operator is procuring a set of different types of goods. Each bidder has a private true cost function c : R t + → R + that is nondecreasing with c(0) = 0. We assume that this cost has an additive from, c(x) = t τ =1 c τ (x τ ). Typically, in these markets, bids are submitted separately for each type with an upper-bound on the amount to be procured,X τ ∈ R + . The operator treats these bids as bids from different identities, and then distributes the payments accordingly. In this case, the set L is the extended set of bidders such that the bid profile is given by the bids of the form c l :
Define the set {A τ } t τ =1 to be a partition of the set L where each set A τ ⊆ L is the set of bidders submitting a bid for type τ . Specifically, we consider auctions modeled by the optimization:
where
Here, the function M : 2 t → R + defines the amount the operator wants to procure from possible combinations of different types of goods. We assume that M (∅) = 0 (normalized). We remark that the optimization problem in (8) contains the case in Example 2.
In the following result we see that provided that c l and M satisify convexity and supermodularity conditions, respectively, then J is supermodular. The proof is relegated to Appendix F. 
As a corollary of this result, the conditions on c l , l ∈ L and M in Theorem 5 imply core VCG outcomes for (8) 
where M ({A}) = 0 and M ({A, B, C}) = 0. Then, the VCG outcome under collusion is blocked by a deal between the operator and bidder 1. Now instead consider, the following constraint set:
Under this new constraint set, type A can still replace types B and C, but it cannot replace both types at the same time.
Note that the function H is supermodular, normalized and nondecreasing, which satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 5. So, here the VCG outcome lies in the core. Specifically, under the VCG mechanism, bidders 2 and 4 become winners and receive p 2 = 350 + (650 − 600) = 400 CHF and p 4 = 250 + (750 − 600) = 400 CHF. This outcome is not blocked by any other coalition and collusion is not profitable for bidders.
This example illustrates that marginally increasing cost curves are not enough to conclude the supermodularity of the reverse auction market model (1) . We showed that coalitionproof VCG outcomes require many conditions and restrictions on the bidders and the constraint set. With these restrictions, we cannot capture the complexity of the market model (1). In the following Section, we restrict our attention to the coalitionproof mechanisms that do not require any extra conditions.
IV. CORE-SELECTING MECHANISMS
In this Section, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any restrictions on the bidders and the constraint set. In particular, we show that if the mechanism selects its payments from the core, then it is coalition-proof. To this end, we define the core with respect to the submitted bids and refer to it as the revealed core.
Definition 3: For every set of bidders R ⊆ L, the revealed core Core(B R ) ∈ R × R |R| + is defined as follows
An element of the revealed core is called a revealed utility allocation.
A mechanism is said to be core-selecting if it is selecting its payments from the revealed core Core(B). Then, the payment rule is given by
whereū lies in the revealed core Core(B). As a remark, the pay-as-bid mechanism is a core-selecting mechanism wherē u l = 0 for all l ∈ L. Our main result is that these mechanisms give rise to the coalition-proof outcomes. The proof is relegated to Appendix G.
Theorem 6: For the set of bidders L, consider a coreselecting auction mechanism modeled by (1).
(i) A group of bidders who lose when bidding their true values cannot profit by a joint deviation. (ii) Bidding with multiple identities is unprofitable for all bidders. Since it is known that the VCG mechanism is the only D.S.I.C mechanism that solves for the optimal allocation [21] , [45] , and the VCG outcomes may not lie in the core, incentivecompatibility property of the VCG mechanism is relaxed under the core-selecting mechanisms. To alleviate this issue, we investigate the core-selecting mechanisms that minimize bidders' maximum gain from a unilateral deviation. We soon see that these mechanisms select the revealed utility allocations that are most preferable for the bidders.
A revealed utility allocationū ∈ Core(B) is bidder-Paretooptimal if there is noũ ∈ Core(B) withũ =ū such that u l ≥ū l for each l ∈ L, andũ l >ū l for some bidder l ∈ L. In Figure 1 , the set of bidder-Pareto-optimal points correspond to the line segment of the core with the maximum total payment. Full information Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid mechanism for the market model (1) are also given by the bidder-Paretooptimal points in the core with respect to the true costs, see [9, Theorem 1] .
It is shown that a core-selecting mechanism minimizes the tendencies to deviate from truthful bids, among all other coreselecting mechanisms, if and only if the mechanism chooses a bidder-Pareto-optimal utility allocation [21] . This result holds since the maximum utility that a bidder can gain by deviating from truthful bidding is given by the difference between the VCG payment and the core-selecting one. We call such mechanisms bidder optimal core-selecting (BOCS) mechanisms. They are successfully deployed in the forward auctions for selling spectrum licenses in the United Kingdom and Switzerland [24] .
We remark that if the VCG outcome lies in the core, then it is the unique bidder-Pareto-optimal point in the core. Then, we conclude that the VCG and BOCS mechanisms are equivalent under the supermodularity condition, given that they solve the same constrained optimization problem (1) . If the supermodularity condition holds, then the VCG outcome lies in the core, and the truthful bidding becomes the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the BOCS mechanism. In Table II , the comparisons of the BOCS, VCG and pay-as-bid mechanisms are provided. Next, we investigate the methods to calculate the BOCS payments. Using our previous results, we first reduce the problem size significantly. However, this calculation may still be computationally infeasible for some instances. Then, we formulate the problem with an iterative approach, which converges fast in practice.
A. Computing payments under the BOCS mechanism
Finding a Pareto-optimal outcome is computationally difficult for auctions involving many bidders, because one needs to solve the reverse auction problem (1) under exponentially many subsets of bidders L to define the core constraints. Furthermore, the auction problem (1) can also be NP-hard in some cases. Invoking Lemma 1, we can reduce the number of constraints to 2 |W | , which grows exponentially only in the number of winners. We call this approach with the reduced number of core constraints the direct BOCS approach. Here, we formulate the problem of calculating the BOCS payments.
We first remove the operator from the definition. Then, by invoking Lemma 1, we keep only the constraints corresponding to the subsets of the winners. Finally, we have that u ∈ Core(B), if and only ifū 0 = −J(B) − l∈Lū l andū −0 lies in
As we already discussed, there can be multiple bidderPareto-optimal core points. We first maximize the sum of the revealed utilities of the bidders, since these payments are known to minimize the sum of potential deviations from the bidders [25] . We can also argue that adopting a total payment maximizing core-selecting mechanism promotes fairness since it is in the combined best interest of the bidders. Notice that these points are a subset of bidder-Pareto-optimal ones. Consequently, BOCS mechanisms maximize the utility of bidders, as follows:
From Figure 1 , we observe that the solutionū * −0 to (9) may not be unique since there are many bidder-Pareto-optimal utility maximizing allocations. From this set, we pick the VCGnearest, which is also called quadratic payment rule [23] : utilities as a reference rule is intuitive and one can choose another utility maximizing allocation by studying the market properties and its participants. For a study on these alternative payment rules, we refer to [22] , [46] .
Unfortunately, this approach is still not a computationally feasible one since there can be many winners to the reverse auction (1) . Therefore, we study the iterative approaches where core constraints are generated on demand.
B. Iterative approach via core constraint generation
Because the number of the core constraints increase exponentially with the number of winners, we cannot enumerate all the core constraints in the reverse auction (1). Hence, the BOCS payments are hard to calculate. As suggested in [25] , the state of the art approach for BOCS is to use constraint generation and in practice, the algorithm requires the generation of only several core constraints. The method was initially used in 1950's in order to solve problems that have too many constraints [47] . Instead of directly solving the large problem, one solves a primary problem with only a subset of its original constraints. From this primary solution, one can formulate a secondary problem that adds another constraint to the first step. The algorithm iterates between these two problems and always converges to the optimal solution of the large problem.
Next, we formulate the core constraint generation algorithm for the reverse auction (1). Previously, this constraint generation method was only formulated for forward auctions of multiple items [25] . We take into account the conceptual differences of our reverse auction model. Define W to be the set of winners and the bidders' VCG utilities asū 0 =ū VCG . As an iterative method, at each step k, we find the blocking coalition that has the largest violation. Then, we add the core constraint for this coalition to the calculation of the BOCS payments.
Given a utility allocationū k −0 ∈ R |L| + , we define the central operator objective at step k as
where bū
Note that even if the bid b l is a convex bid curve, the bid bū k l l is not convex ifū k l = 0, because of the discontinuity at 0. Then, the optimization problem for finding the blocking coalition is given as follows
where C k is said to block the grand coalition for the set of utilities u k −0 . We call the set W \ C k the blocked winners, and the problem (11) generates a core constraint on the utilities of these bidders. Note that, problem (11) essentially solves the reverse auction where winners' bids are inflated by their utilities from the earlier step. After obtaining the blocking coalitions and their corresponding central operator costs z(u k −0 ), we solve the following sets of problems to obtain another candidate for an optimal BOCS outcome. First, we take the subset of utilities that are maximizing the total utility of bidders, as follows:
, hence this term does not require any further solution to the market problem. Then, we determine the utilities as the solution to the following quadratic program:
The entire process for determining the bidder optimal coreselecting payment is summarized in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 converges to the solution of the optimization problem (10) for the BOCS mechanism. We refer to [25, Theorem 4.2] for the proof of convergence of this algorithm. We note that this algorithm may still require the generation of all possible core constraints, which is equivalent to solving the problem (11) 2 |W | times. In practice, even when there are many winners, the algorithm requires the generation of only several core constraints. Using this approach, we can significantly reduce the number of times we need to solve the optimization problem (1).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Our goal is to compare the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms and methods based on electricity market data. Towards that, we consider the pay-as-bid, the LMP, the BOCS, and the VCG mechanisms. First, we consider an optimal dispatch problem with a four-node three-generator network and show that the VCG outcomes are not coalition-proof. Then, we illustrate the coalition-proof outcomes obtained by the BOCS mechanism. Second, we consider the IEEE test systems. We compare the total payment under the LMP, the BOCS, and the VCG mechanisms. We see that the VCG outcomes are in the core. Then, with small modifications to the line limits, we show that the VCG outcomes do not necessarily lie in the core for these test systems as well. Finally, we study the two-stage Swiss reserve procurement auctions. We show that the VCG outcomes are not in the core, hence shill bidding and collusion can be profitable for the bidders.
In order to illustrate the applicability of the BOCS mechanism, we provide the wall-clock time for the computations performed using our setup. We solve all optimization problems with GUROBI [48] , called through MATLAB via YALMIP [49] , on a computer equipped with a 32 GB RAM and a 4.0 GHz quad-core Intel i7 processor.
A. Four-node three-generator network model
We consider a dispatch problem with the DC power-flow model in Figure 3 . Cost curves are quadratic polynomials. All lines have the same susceptance and the line limit, adopting the models considered in [10] , [14] . Under the VCG mechanism, payments and utilities are given in the first column of Table III . Suppose, via coalition, bidders 1 and 2 change their bids to b l (x) = 0 for all x ∈ R t + . Then, bidders 1 and 2 are the only winners of the dispatch problem and their payments and utilities are given in the second column of Table III Next, we consider the BOCS mechanism. Under the BOCS mechanism, payments and utilities are given in the first column of Table IV . Suppose, via coalition, bidders 1 and 2 change their bids to b l (x) = 0 for all x ∈ R t + . Then, bidders 1 and 2 are the only winners of the dispatch problem and their payments and utilities are given in the second column of Table  IV . We observe that the collective utility of bidders 1 and 2 decreases from 1386.2 CHF to 1110.0 CHF. Hence, in this case, collusion is not profitable. 
B. IEEE test systems with DC power-flow models
The following simulations are based on the IEEE test systems with DC power-flow models, adopting the models considered in [10] , [14] .
1) 14-bus, 30-bus and 118-bus test systems:
We consider the IEEE 14-bus [50] , 30-bus [51], [52] and 118-bus test systems [50] . We assume all bidders are truthful and the true cost curves are provided in the references. In practice, this can only hold in the VCG mechanism since it is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible. The corresponding total payments of the mechanisms are shown in Table V . All the mechanisms lead to the same winner allocation, as expected. For all three test systems, we observe that the VCG mechanism has a slightly larger total payment than the LMP mechanism. Moreover, the VCG payment of every bidder is larger than their LMP payments. For the DC power-flow models with convex increasing bids, this result was proven in [14, Theorem 2] .
Another observation is that the VCG outcomes are in the core for all systems, and we explain each. 14-bus and 118-bus systems do not have any line limits, hence, they have the form in (7) and supermodularity condition holds. However, 30-bus system has line limits. This result can be explained in two ways. First, none of the line limit constraints are tight. Second, we observe that removing two bidders can yield to an infeasible problem, similar to Proposition 1. These test systems are specialized instances and they do not necessarily conclude that the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof for the DC powerflow models. We examine this shortcoming of the VCG in our next simulation.
Computation times are provided only for the 118-bus case, because the other problems are trivially small. For this electricity market, the direct BOCS approach is not computationally feasible, because there are 19 winners out of 54 bidders and the optimal cost calculation takes 451 milliseconds. This approach would require 66 hours. Computation times for the VCG mechanism and the CCG algorithm are 24.8 and 31.4 seconds, respectively. The CCG algorithm runs after the VCG mechanism and converges after only a single iteration. This iteration takes 6.6 seconds, because the step in (11) has binary variables whereas the optimal cost calculation for the market model does not.
2) Effect of line limits:
We consider the IEEE 14-bus test system, with a line limit on lines exiting node 1, connecting it to the nodes 2 and 5. We set this line limit to be 10 MW. We again assume all bidders are truthful. The corresponding total payments of the mechanisms are shown in Table VI . We observe that the VCG outcome does not lie in the core. Line limits are tight and the problem does not have the form in (7). Hence, shill bidding and collusion can be profitable for bidders. Moreover, we observe that the BOCS yields a larger total payment than the LMP. We underline that this does not necessarily hold for the payment of a single bidder, because the BOCS payment depends on the Pareto-optimal point chosen. For some bidders, the BOCS payment can be equal to the payas-bid (which is smaller than the LMP payment), whereas for some others it can be equal to the VCG payment (which is larger than the LMP payment).
With this result, we also reiterate that the convex bids are not enough to ensure that the VCG outcomes are in the core. Similar results can be obtained for 118-bus test system by fixing a line limit 180 MW on every line. For this particular example, computation times for the VCG mechanism and the CCG algorithm are 3.6 and 8.2 seconds, respectively. The CCG algorithm runs after the VCG mechanism and converges after 4 iterations.
C. Swiss reserve procurement auctions
The following simulations are based on the bids placed in the 46th weekly Swiss reserve procurement auction of 2014 [6] . The reverse auction involves 21 power plants bidding for secondary reserves, 25 for tertiary positive and 21 for tertiary negative. There are complex constraints from reserve deficit probabilities. Moreover, the constraints include coupling between first and second stage decision variables corresponding to the weekly and daily reserve auctions. The corresponding total payments and procured MWs of the payas-bid mechanism, the BOCS mechanism, and the VCG mechanism are shown in Table VII . We observe that the VCG payment rule yields the highest total payment and the BOCS the second highest. Note that the bids from the power plants are not marginally nondecreasing for all quantities and the constraints are nonstandard. Hence, the supermodularity condition does not hold and we also observe that the VCG outcome does not lie in the core. As a result, shill bidding and collusion can be profitable for bidders under the VCG mechanism.
For this electricity market, the direct BOCS approach is not computationally feasible, because there are 28 winners and the optimal cost calculation takes 8 seconds. This approach would require 68 years. Computation times for the VCG mechanism and the CCG algorithm are 580.6 and 659.2 seconds, respectively. The CCG algorithm runs after the VCG mechanism and converges after 4 iterations.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced a constrained optimization problem to model reverse auctions that may involve continuum values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We discussed the game theoretic analysis of these reverse auction mechanisms under different payment rules. We first showed that the VCG mechanism results in a dominantstrategy incentive-compatible Nash equilibrium. Through examples, we then showed that it suffers from collusion and shill bidding. Motivated by this problem, we derived three different conditions under which collusion and shill bidding are not profitable, and hence the VCG mechanism is coalition-proof. Since these conditions are restrictive, and they do not capture the constrained optimization problem under consideration, we investigated the closest we can achieve to the property of incentive-compatibility under a coalition-proof mechanism. To this end, we formulated the bidder optimal core-selecting mechanism. By removing incentives for collusion, we expect the bidding process to be simplified, and this can help us promote participation to the market. Finally, we verified our results in several case studies based on electricity market data.
Future work involves developing conditions that imply supermodularity for a more generic market model. As an extension, we consider exploring learning Nash equilibria in such markets to model the behavior of the bidders in a repeated setting.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
This proof generalizes the one in [15] that considers only the discrete bids. a) We distinguish between bidder l placing a generic bid B l = b l and bidding truthfully C l = c l . For the set of bids B, the utility of bidder l is given by:
where the term in brackets is the costJ of (x * (B), y * (B)) but evaluated atĈ = (C l , B −l ), see (1) . ForĈ, note that, u l (Ĉ) = h(B −l ) − J(Ĉ). Then, we have the following:
We can show that
) is a feasible suboptimal allocation for the available bidsĈ. Therefore, bidding truthfully is the best strategy, regardless of other bidders' strategies B −l .
b) By the definition of VCG payment rule and incentivecompatibility, we have
, which is maximized by the optimization problem (1) . c) Positive transfers can be verified substituting Clarke pivot rule for h(B −l ):
for all set of bids B. For individual rationality, assume bidders are not bidding less than their true costs, that is,
for all set of bids B.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The utility allocation u is unblocked by every S ⊆ L if and only if
since the losing bidders are not allocated and they obtain zero payment. Thus, the core can equivalently be parametrized as
Moreover, fixing K = W \ S, the dominant constraints are those corresponding to minimal J(C S ), in particular, when S = L \ K (this being maximal set with K not taking part in the coalition S).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove that supermodularity is sufficient for u VCG to lie in the core, we prove that (4) holds. Let K = {l 1 . . . l k }. Notice that, by supermodularity,
The last inequality holds by interpolating the last summation. Thus, we see that (4) holds and so, by Lemma 1, the VCG outcome belongs to the core.
To prove that supermodularity is also necessary for outcomes to lie in the core, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the supermodularity condition does not hold for a bidder l. Then, there exist sets S ⊆ R where
We may, without loss of generality, chose R = S ∪ {i} for some i. To see this, take S 0 = S and
The strict inequality above must hold for one of the sum-
. So we may consider sets S ⊆ R that differ by one bidder, say i. In addition, let R and S the sets of minimal cardinality. Thus, by minimality,
Further, after rearranging the above inequality we see that
That is both bidder i and l are winners of the VCG auction with bidders R. Considering the auction with the set of bidders R and with i, l ∈ W , and K = {i, l}, we have:
where in the inequality above we apply (14) . Thus, given Lemma 1, (4) does not hold and so u VCG / ∈ Core(C R ). Thus the outcome of the VCG mechanism is not in the core for the subset of bidders R.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
(i) Let K be a set of colluders who would lose the auction when bidding their true values C K = {c l } l∈K , while bidding B K = {b l } l∈K they become winners, that is, they are all allocated a positive quantity. We define C = (C K , C −K ) and B = (B K , C −K ) where C −K = {c l } l∈L\K denotes the truthful bidding profile of the remaining bidders. The VCG utility that each player l in K receives under B is
where the first inequality follows from the D.S.I.C property of the VCG mechanism, the equality comes from the definition of the VCG mechanism and the second inequality applies the supermodularity of the function J. The equality comes from the fact that K originally was a group of losers.
So we see that, for all l ∈ K, the utility u VCG l (B) is upper bounded by the utility that l would receive by lowering their bid unilaterally. However, by Theorem 1a) we know the bidder cannot not face any benefit in doing so. And thus there is no benefit from losers colluding by jointly deviating their bids.
(ii) We denote with S ⊂ L multiple identities of the same bidder l. We have that c l ( k∈S x k ) = k∈S c k (x k ) (otherwise shill bidding by bidder l is followed by a collusion of bids). Since the outcome is in the core, by Lemma 1, we have
where J(C −S ) is the cost when S, or equivalently l, is removed from the auction. DefiningL = {L \ S} ∪ {l}, we see that
Therefore, the total VCG utility that l receives from shill bidding is upper bounded by the utility that l would receive by bidding as a single bidder. Making use of shills, hence, is not profitable.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4
To prove Theorem 4, the following Lemma is needed. Lemma 2: Under the market model (7), for an auction with bidders S and R = S ∪ {j} with corresponding allocations x and x , marginally increasing costs imply that ∀l ∈ S, x l ≤ x l .
Proof: The proof follows by contradiction. That is, we will show that when x is such that x l > x l , for some l ∈ S, then x can be modified to provide a lower cost via the allocation q for bidders S (thus contradicting optimality of x). First, we notice that since bids are equally spaced by the amount m and with marginally increasing cost, l∈S x l = l∈R x l = M holds. (We remark that this observation also holds for continuous strictly convex costs.) Now, in order to procure exactly M from bidders R, some bidders' allocations must decrease, that is, the set K = {l ∈ S | x l < x l } is nonempty. Consider a feasible allocation q for the auction with bidders R where the amound M is being procured and
So, q is constructed from x by transferring the amount m = l∈S\K x l −x l from bidders in S\K to bidders in K. In doing so, the inequality x l ≤ q l ≤ x l can be maintained:
The above inequality holds because when summing over l ∈ S, x l 's sum to M and x l 's sum to M − x j .
Since x is optimal for bidders R and q is not:
where we usedJ(q ) as a short-hand-notation for the cost corresponding to choosing the allocation q under truthful bidding. Now, we use the marginally increasing true costs to replace the summations over K in (15) . In particular, define q = (q l : l ∈ S) so that
Note that q is feasible since x and q have the same sum over S (and thus cancel) and x l is feasible. Further, since
Adding (16) to both side of (15) (and canceling c j (x j )) gives
which contradicts the optimality of x. (Same argument also holds for continuous strictly convex costs.) Corollary 1: Given the conditions in Theorem 4 and the optimal allocation to procure the amount M , for any lower amount (while being multiple of m) to be procured, the allocation for each bidder does not increase.
This corollary follows from Lemma 2. Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof: We prove that J is supermodular. We adopt the same notation used in Lemma 2 and we identify with W ⊆ S the set of winners. For each l / ∈ W , we have by definition x l = 0. Thus 0 = J(C S\l ) − J(C S ), (since the optimal solution is unchanged when l is removed from S). By Lemma 2, x l = 0 and so 0 = J(C R\l )−J(C R ) also. Thus, supermodularity holds for l / ∈ W .
For each winning bidder, w ∈ W , denote u VCG w (C S ) = J(C S\w ) − J(C S ). Adopting the same notation of Lemma 2, we can indicate it as:
where l are the optimal allocations of each l ∈ S −w , when w exits the auction. By Lemma 2, in fact, l ≥ x l . Similarly, after bidder i enters the auction, u
where i are the amounts accepted from l ∈ R −w when w exits the new auction. By Lemma 2, we again have l ≥ x l .
Notice that so far we applied Lemma 2 to justify the increase of the accepted amounts, first, from each l ∈ S −w and now from l ∈ R −w , due to the exit of w from the auctions. We can apply Lemma 2 again and affirm that x l ≤ x l ∀l ∈ S, and in particular x w ≤ x w , because of the entrance of i.
We now find suitable lower and upper bounds to ensure inequality u
, where q l 's are from the cheapest allocation to procure the amount (M − x w ) among S −w . By Lemma 2 we have l ≥ q l ≥ x l ∀l ∈ S −w , since x l 's sum to (M − x w ) ≤ (M − x w ) (due to x w ≤ x w ), and l 's sum to M . Moreover, since every c l are marginally increasing, q l 's are such that l∈S−w ( l − q l ) = x w , because exactly the amount M is purchased. (Again, this observation also holds for continuous strictly convex costs.) Using the above suboptimal allocation, we have a lower bound for u VCG w (C S ):
Defining now δ l = ( l − q l ), ∀l ∈ S −w we must have
, since the right hand side is a feasible cost to procure the amount M among the bidders {S, i} \ w. Indeed, l∈S x l + x i = M and l∈S−w δ l = x w . Hence, we have:
Moreover, via marginally increasing costs (also via strictly convex costs), we have:
(c l (x l + δ l ) − c l (x l )) ≤ (c l ( l ) − c l (q l )), ∀l ∈ S −w . (18) The above holds because ∀l ∈ S −w , ( l − q l ) = (x l + δ l − x l ) = δ l and x l ≤ q l . In particular, x l are the amounts accepted to procure the amount (M − x w ) among {S, i} \ w, while q l are those to procure the same amount among S −w . Then, combining equations (18) and (17), we finally obtain u VCG w (C R ) ≤ u VCG w (C S ).
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 5 We prove that J is supermodular. To this end, we reparametrize the problem (8) into another class of optimization problems. We define the function f : 2 |L| → R + as follows f (A) = max ∀T ⊆{1,...,t}, A⊇A T
M (T ).
We consider the following optimization problem:
First, notice that f (A T ) = M (T ). Since x l ≥ 0, ∀l, the constraints added by the definition of the function f are all redundant constraints. Then, these constraints are feasible in (19) , once the constraints in (8) are satisfied. Hence, these problems are equivalent. We also remark that f (∅) = 0 and f is nondecreasing.
Before we proceed, we need to show that supermodularity of the function M implies the supermodularity of the function f . Suppose f (A) = M (T A ) and f (B) = M (T B ) for some T A , T B . Then,
First inequality follows from supermodularity of the function M . Last inequality holds since these sets are feasible suboptima for f (A ∪ B) and f (A ∩ B). We conclude that the function f is supermodular. Note that, given supermodularity of the function f , the first set of constraints in (19) defines a contra-polymatroid, see [53, Section 44] for a detailed exposition. This class of problems are important in combinatorial optimization because they can often be solved in polynomial time. For the proof, we extend the work in [54] on replenishment games to reverse auctions over contra-polymatroids and box constraints.
We first show that the constraint l∈L x l = f (L) is redundant and can be added to the original constraint set. We denote S c = L \ S and denote x * as the optimal allocation for (19) . It can be shown that for every x * k , k ∈ S , there exists a set k ∈ A k ⊆ L such that l∈A k x * l = f (A k ) is tight at the optimal solution. We can prove this via contradiction. Assume, for x * k , k ∈ S, there does not exist a set k ∈ A k ⊆ L such that l∈A k x * l ≥ f (A k ) is tight. Then, one can simply decrease the value of x * k and get a lower objective value. Furthermore, note that, any constraint corresponding to A ⊃ S c is redundant to A ∪ S c because f is nondecreasing and x l = 0, ∀l ∈ S c . Then this set A k has to be a superset of S c , A k ⊃ S c . Next we show that if the constraints for A and B are tight, so is A ∪ B.
Inequality (20a) follows from supermodularity of f , f (A ∪ B)−f (A) ≥ f (B)−f (A∩B) . Equality (20b) follows from A and B being tight. We arranged the terms in the equality (20c). Inequality (20d) follows from the feasibility of x * for the problem in (19) . Then, it is easy to see that (20d) is in fact an equality and we can conclude that l∈A∪B x * l = f (A ∪ B) . Recall that the constraint corresponding the set A l ⊃ S c ∪ {l} is tight for x * l , we can conclude that the constraint l∈S A l = L is also tight and l∈L x * l = f (L) holds for optimal solution.
Next we reformulate the first set of constraints as follows. We see that k(A) = h(A)−h(∅) is a nondecreasing submodular function and it is normalized. In literature, the function k is called a rank function [53] . Note that, k(S) = h(S) − h(∅) = −g(L\S)+g(L). From the feasibility of the problem (19), we have that g(L \ S) = 0 and k(S) = l∈L x l . We reorganize the constraint set and obtain the following:
Finally, given that k is nondecreasing and x l = 0, ∀l ∈ L \ S, we can show that the constraints corresponding to A ⊃ S are redundant upper bounds. Then, we obtain the following
The following result is known, and we refer to [55, Theorem 6 .1] and [56] . The set P ∩ {x | x l ≤X l , ∀l} is equivalent to the set,
wheref (A) = min B⊆A {k(A \ B) + l∈BX l } and this function is also a rank function [55] . We also assert that f (S) = k(S). To see that:
k(S) = 
The first set of constraints in (22) define a polymatroid, see [53, Section 44] . In [54, Theorem 3] , it is proven that maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid results in a submodular optimal objective value. The result also directly includes optimizing over the base polymatroid where the polymatroid constraint set is intersected with the equality l∈S x l =f (S). Then, −J is submodular, and J is supermodular.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 6
First, we need the following Lemma. Lemma 3: Letū ∈ R × R
